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NOTE 
EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION IN UNITED 
STATES v. FARHAD: ISSUES IN 
WAIVING A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of the law ... He lacks both the skill 
and knowledge adequately to prepare for. his defense, even 
though he have [sic] a perfect one. He requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not·guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more 
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intel-
lect. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the United States Supreme Court's recognition 
of the right to waive counsel in Faretta v. California,2 the cor-
ollary right to self-representation has been a constant compo-
1 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (Opening quote written by Justice 
Sutherland). 
2 
422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has an 
absolute right to waive counsel, recognizing the right to self-representation. See id. 
·129 
1
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nent of the American criminal justice system.3 In Farhad v. 
United States,4 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's re-
peated statement of an unequivocal desire for self-
representation constitutes a valid waiver of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. 6 Citing Faretta, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and unequivo-
cal waiver of his right to self-representation.6 However, the 
Ninth Circuit ignored the more fundamental issue of whether 
upholding defendant's right to self-representation resulted in 
the denial of his right to a fair trial. 
Though all U.S. courts recognize the right to self-
representation as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Faretta, constitutional and procedural issues affect its effective 
implementation. This note explores the Sixth Amendment's 
right to waive counsel and its effect on a criminal defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right to receive a fair trial. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Farhad is critiqued on two issues: first, the 
failure to address standby counsel in sharing duties of repre-
sentation with the defendant;7 and second, the court's failure 
to address Farhad's lack of access to the means of developing 
his case.8 Lastly, this note proposes the appointment of man-
datory standby counsel for pro se defendants as a means of 
protecting the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to 
a fair trial while respecting the defendant's autonomy in the 
criminal justice system. 
3 
See infra notes 51-157 and accompanying text. 
4 
190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 
6 . 
See ,d. at 1100. 
6 See id. 
7 . 
See ,d. at 1099. In Farhad, the lower court refused defendant's request to share 
duties with standby counsel. Rather, they provided him with the assistance of standby 
counsel limited generally to providing guidance and answering defendant's questions 
throughout the trial. See id. 
8 
See id. at 1099. The lower court also denied Farhad's repeated requests for access 
to a legal library , investigator and witnesses. See id. 
2
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
While serving an unrelated sentence at San Quentin State 
Penitentiary, Kashani Farhad filed 29 fraudulent tax returns 
claiming refunds from 16 states.9 Farhad collected approxi-
mately $20,000 using fictitious employers and social security 
numbers. 10 Prison officials became suspicious of the volume of 
mail from state tax bureaus and ultimately uncovered 
Farhad's scheme.11 Farhad was indicted on fourteen counts of 
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,12 and five counts for 
the fraudulent use of social security numbers in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).13 
9 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098. Defendant developed a simple scheme of filing 
fraudulent tax returns using his own name, prisoner ID number, and prison address. 
See id. 
10 . 
See id. at 1098. 
11S id ee . 
12 . . 
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1999). "Frauds and sWindles" proVIdes: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose 
of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or 
procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, 
security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or 
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of 
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any 
post office or authorized mail depository for mail matter, any matter or 
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or depos-
its or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or 
receives there from, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to 
be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, 
or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to 
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 1d. 
~ . 
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 408 (1999). "Penalties" provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) In General. Whoever - (7) for the purpose of causing an increase 
in any payment authorized under this title [42 USCS §§ 401 et seq.J (or 
any other program financed in whole or in part from Federal funds), or 
for the purpose of causing a payment under this title [42 USCS §§ 401 
et seq.J (or any such other program (to be made when no payment is 
authorized thereunder, or for the purpose of obtaining (for himself or 
any other person) any payment or any benefit to which he (or such 
other person), is not entitled, or for the purpose of obtaining anything 
of value from any person, or for any other purpose - (B) with intent to 
deceive, falsely represents a number to be the social security account 
number assigned by the Commissioner of Social Security to him or to 
3
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The district court appointed a federal public defender to 
represent Farhad. 14 However, Farhad informed the court that 
he intended to proceed pro se. 15 The district court held a 
hearing to determine Farhad's competence to represent him-
self and questioned Farhad under oath regarding his decision 
to go forward pro se.16 The district court informed Farhad of 
the charges against him and the potential consequences if con-
victed. 17 Farhad replied that he understood the court's concern 
but reiterated his decision to proceed without counsel. 18 The 
district court warned Farhad that he was "making things 
harder" for himself by electing to proceed pro se.19 The district 
court also informed Farhad that he would not have the assis-
tance of standby counsel,20 the use of an investigator, or access 
to a law library.21 Despite these warnings from the court, 
another person, when in fact such number is not the social security ac-
count number assigned by the Commissioner of Social Security to him 
or to such other person. [d. 
14 
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Under the Sixth Amendment right to 
the assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant is always required to have counsel. If 
the defendant is indigent, the state is required to provide a public defender. See id. 
15 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098. "Pro se" is Latin for "for himself." In a legal con-
text, pro se representation is one in which an individual represents himself without 
the aid of counsel. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). 
16 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098. Responding to the court's questions regarding 
Farhad's understanding of the proceedings and why he wanted to represent himself, 
Farhad stated he believed he could put forth a "more effective defense" than a public 
defender. [d. 
17 
See id. The court warned Farhad that each of the nineteen counts had a "maxi-
mum penalty of five years in prison," which could run consecutively and "result in a 
very long time." The court also explained that each count exposed him to a $250,000 
fine, three years supervised release, a $50 special assessment fee; and a restitution 
order. Rep. Tr. at 8-9. 
18 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. 
19 [d. at 1098. The court informed Farhad that he would be responsible for arguing 
motions, making objections, and abiding by the rules of evidence and procedure. The 
court stated Farhad would "not get any breaks from the Court," again informing him 
that he had the right to attorney representation. See id. 
20 See id. at 1099. The term "standby counsel" refers to a public defender appointed 
to a pro se defendant acting in an advisory role. There are varying levels of assistance 
standby counsel may provide. See John H. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for 
Pro Se Defendants: Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 697, 
713 (1984). 
4
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Farhad indicated that he still wished to proceed pro se, insist-
ing on his "absolute right" to act as his own attorney.22 
Despite the court's warning that he was not entitled to 
standby counsel, the district court appointed an assistant pub-
lic defender to assist Farhad.23 Farhad informed the court that 
he wanted to make his own opening and closing statements as 
well as exercise challenges during jury selection.24 Farhad re-
quested that standby counsel perform all other duties.25 The 
district court rejected Farhad's proposition, stating that "it 
cannot be done that way. You do it all or he does it a11.n26 
Farhad withdrew his request for "hybrid representationn27 and 
the district court held that Farhad had knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his right to counsel and permitted him to proceed 
pro se.28 Nevertheless, during pre-trial preparations, the dis-
trict court asked Farhad on several occasions whether he 
21 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. The court also informed Farhad that if he proceeded 
pro 8e, he would lose a right to appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of 




24 See id. 
25 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. Farhad sought to have standby counsel to cross-
examine witnesses, make objections, and make motions to the court. See id. 
~ . 
[d. The court, in its discretion, may deny "hybrid counsel" pursuant to the Su-
preme Court's ruling in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (holding that a trial 
judge is not required to permit "hybrid" representation). 
27 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. Hybrid representation or co-counsel has been de-
fined as the "most extreme form of advisory counsel" where both defendant and coun-
sel participate in jury selection, statements, and questioning. See Pearson, supra note 
20, at 713. 
28 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. 
5
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wanted counsel. 29 In response to the court's inquiries, Farhad 
reaffirmed his commitment to represent himself.30 
Farhad performed miserably at trial. 31 With no under-
standing of the rules of evidence, Farhad repeatedly thwarted 
his case by providing admissions and failing to protect his in-
terests.32 Farhad's inability to properly represent himself was 
further apparent during cross examination.33 While cross-
examining a government witness, Farhad argued with the wit-
ness about his testimony.34 Further, Farhad failed to object to 
damaging testimony.35 Accordingly, the court attempted to 
29 
See id. On one occasion, when the court refused Farhad's request for an investi-
gator to help him locate witnesses, the court said, "You've chosen to represent your-
self. Now if [the public defender] were representing you in this case, then he has a 
number of resources available to him ... That's why you're really hurting your chances 
in this case by doing this. You can reconsider, by the way, if you want to change your 
mind, and get [the public defender] to represent you." [d. 
30 
See id. 
31 See id. at 1102. 
32 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. Prior to Farhad deciding to proceed pro se, the 
federal public defender had obtained an order restricting the introduction of evidence 
of Farhad's prior conviction and current incarceration. During opening statements, 
Farhad informed the jury, "I am a prisoner myself, you know?" He also stated, "I 
might have done these things, but you know, it's not very certain, you know, that for 
sure I have done this ... I'm not saying that no checks have been coming to my house. 
It might have been." Farhad also admitted, "[I] had some tax forms in my cell." He 
concluded his opening statement by informing the jury that "it doesn't matter what 
you think, you know?" [d. at 1102-1103. 
33 
See id. at 1103. 
34 See id. 
35 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1103. One damaging colloquy involved the cross-
examination of the correctional officer who searched his cell and discovered the tax 
forms: 
Q: Is that possible, that the boxes, you know, that has my name - it was written by 
another 
inmate? 
A: No, it was not. 
Q: How can that be? 
A: Because your cell mate's box was on one end of the bed, and you made sure your 
box was on 
the other end. You did not have anything but a box of tax forms. And Kashani, 
if you want 
to get into it, you're a loner, you have all your stuff to yourself. Nobody even 
knew much 
6
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persuade Farhad to allow standby counsel to take his direct 
testimony but Farhad again refused and insisted on proceeding 
alone.36 Farhad's effort to take direct testimony consisted of 
asking and answering questions to himself.37 Additionally, 
Farhad asked himself argumentative and leading questions 
which misstated the law. 38 Farhad faced similar problems 
when providing evidence to the jury.39 For example, when 
Farhad submitted a handwriting exemplar to the jury, the 
court had to instruct the jury to disregard it because it stated: 
"Farhad is an innocent man.,,40 
Furthermore, Farhad failed to understand the 
proceedings.41 He confused the roles played by various people 
in the courtroom.42 For example, Farhad repeatedly referred to 
the prosecution witness as the defendant.43 Additionally, 
Farhad did not know the meaning of the word "stipulation" or 
understand its significance when informed of the implication of 
entering into a stipulation regarding his fingerprints and 
handwriting.44 At the close of the prosecution's case, Farhad 
about you. You don't even talk to people at the prison. 
Farhad neither objected to this testimony nor asked that it be stricken. He never ob-
jected that the government's failure to lay any foundation for the testimony that the 
bunk searched was Farhad's, but instead admitted that the tax forms were his, and 
that he was reading them "like a magazine or book." [d. 
36 S id ee . 37 . 
See id. In the course of his testimony, Farhad referred to himself interchangea-
bly as "you," "me," "Mr. Farhad," "Farhad Kashani," and "Kashani Farhad." [d. 
38 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102-1103. One of his first questions was: "Mr. Farhad, 
did San Quentin authority throw you in the hole based on a phone call that a depart-
. ment of revenue made to them?" The district court sustained an objection to this . 




[d. at 1104. 
41 See id. at 1103. 
42 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1104. 
43 See id. 
44 
See id. A stipulation is an agreement, admission, or concession made by parties 
in a judicial proceeding. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1451 (6th ed. 1990). When the 
stipulated evidence was presented during trial, Farhad asked the court to "take that 
stipulation away." See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1104. 
7
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asked the court to have standby counsel sit away from him be-
cause he believed that the lawyer was laughing and making 
faces at him.45 
Farhad's closing argument consisted of declarations that he 
should be found "100 percent not guilty" because "there was no 
videotape. There was no camera. There was no pic-
tures ... There was no DNA.,,46 Farhad also asked the jury to 
return a "true verdict, a just verdict, that the prosecution has 
proved its allegation.'047 The jury found Farhad guilty on all 19 
counts.48 The court sentenced Farhad to 27 months in prison 
and ordered him to pay $19,095.70 in restitution.49 Farhad 
filed four pro se notices of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.50 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. ESTABLISHING A PROCEDURAL MINIMUM STANDARD TO 
WAIVE COUNSEL 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
right to self-representation in Faretta u. California,51 finding 
implicit in the Sixth Amendment a right to self-representation 
in criminal cases.52 The defendant, Anthony Faretta, was 
45 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1104. The judge ordered Farhad's stand by counsel to 
sit in the back of the courtroom, ending contact between standby counsel and defen-
dant. See id. 
46 d J, • 
47 
[d. at 1097. Farhad was convicted on 14 counts of mail fraud and 5 counts of the 
false use of social security numbers. See id. 
48 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105. 
49 
See id. at 1098. 
50 . • 
See Id. at 1105. Farhad claimed on four separate appeals that he had not know-
ingly, intelligently, and unequivocally waived his right to counsel. Additionally, he 
argued that the right to self-representation should be reconsidered. See id. 
51 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
52 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. The Court in Faretta reasoned that because the 
Sixth Amendment discusses counsel for criminal defendants as "assistance of counsel," 
8
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charged with grand theft and requested permission from the 
. Superior Court of Los Angeles County to proceed pro se.53 The 
superior court questioned Faretta to determine his under-
standing of the proceedings.54 Based on Faretta's responses, 
the court issued a preliminary ruling accepting Faretta's 
waiver of the assistance of counsel. 55 Soon after granting 
Faretta's request to represent himself, the superior court, on 
its own initiative, held a hearing to determine Faretta's compe-
tence to represent himself. 56 Faretta's answers led the court to 
believe that he did not understand what self-representation 
entailed. 57 Therefore, the superior court concluded Faretta had 
not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. 58 The 
court then reversed its earlier ruling that allowed Faretta to 
proceed pro se and appointed a public defender to represent 
him. 59 Faretta was convicted at trial and appealed on the 
ground that denial of his request to represent himself violated 
his Constitutional right to waive counsel. 60 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari61 and reversed.62 
it nece88arily implies a right to waive that assistance. The Court also analyzed Anglo-
American legal traditions of self-representation as implying the right to self-
representation. See id. 
53 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in 
an information filed in Los Angeles County. See id. 
54 
See id. at 808. Faretta indicated that he had represented himself before, that he 
was a high school graduate, and that he wished to represent himself because he be-
lieved the public defender was too busy to effectively represent him. See id. 
55 
See id. Prior to Faretta, courts routinely questioned defendants wishing to pro-
ceed pro se in an effort to determine the extent of their legal knowledge and to warn 
them of the equal treatment they would receive. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808. 
56 . 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808. Under the then-applicable California Supreme 
Court case People v. Sharp, 499 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1972), the judge inquired into Faretta's 
ability to conduct his own defense and questioned him specifically about the hearsay 




See id. at 809-810. 
59 
See id. at 810. 
60 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811. Faretta claimed the trial court denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to waive counsel. See id. 
61 . 
See id. at 812,. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent 
9
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The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has the 
right to proceed without counsel when the decision to do so is 
made voluntarily and intelligently.63 The Court concluded that 
although a pro se defendant may "conduct his own defense ul-
timately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.,,64 
Further, the Court acknowledged that, historically, self-
representation was traditionally permitted in· the Anglo-
American legal system.65 
In Faretta, the Supreme Court laid the groundrules for all 
future criminal defendants who decide to proceed pro se. So 
long as a defendant can show that he has intelligently, volun-
tarily, and unequivocally waived his right to counsel, he is free 
to proceed pro se.66 However, the decision to represent oneself 
has its share of problems, some of which. were discussed by 
himself based on a then-recent California Supreme Court decision, People v. Sharp, 
499 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1972). Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed Faretta's convic-
tion. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion, and the California Supreme 
Court denied review. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. See id. 
62 
See id. at 836. 
63 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. The Supreme Court explained that the Sixth 
amendment does not expressly grant the right to self-representation, but that it is 
necessarily "implied" by the amendment's structure. This implied right, the Court 
explained, is derived from the language of the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence." The Court reasoned that to force counsel upon a defendant 
would violate the logic of the Sixth Amendment because the Amendment refers to the 
"assistance" of counsel, which implied that the role of the attorney is subordinate to 
that of the client. Thus, where counsel is forced upon an unwilling defendant, the 
attorney becomes the "master" and the right to make a defense is stripped of the per-
sonal character upon which the Amendment insists. See id. at 808. 
64 
ld. at 834. The Court reasoned that because it is the defendant who suffers the 
consequences if the defense fails, the determination of how to proceed and with whom 
lies with the defendant. ld. 
65 
See id. at 821-832. Analyzing the history of self-representation, the Court looked 
as far back as 16th and 17th century England, the colonial underpinnings of the Sixth 
Amendment, and §35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that "parties may 
plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of ... counsel." See 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821-832. 
66 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832. 
10
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four justices dissenting from the majority Faretta opinion. 67 
Justice Blackmun, in a separately written dissent cautioned 
that the procedural ramifications of Faretta would "haunt the 
trial of every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self-
representation. ,,68 
B. DEFINING THE COURT'S DUTIES 
After Faretta, courts were faced with the task of interpret-
ing, refining and developing feasible procedural mechanisms to 
implement the right to self-representation. In Faretta, the Su-
preme Court established a standard procedure which all lower 
courts must follow. Additionally, courts have developed nu-
merous sub-issues of the right to self-representation to meet 
concerns not foreseen when Faretta was decided. 
In Godinez v. Moran,69 the Supreme Court established the 
inquiry required to allow a defendant to proceed pro se.70 The 
Court held that trial courts must follow a four-part inquiry to 
establish a valid waiver of counsel. 71 The four parts are: 1) the 
accused must understand the nature of the charges against 
67 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836-845 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Three of the four dis-
senting justices, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist, in-
sisted that no independent constitutional basis supports the right to self-
representation. See id. at 844. They argued that no such right is "tucked between the 
lines of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 837. Rather, they argued, the Sixth Amend-
ment expressly omitted the right to self-representation, implying the right's exclusion 
by the framers. See id. at 844. Further, Chief Justice Burger contended that the 
majority decision would add congestion in the courts and the quality of justice would 
suffer, leading to waning public confidence in a judicial system that allowed obtaining 
easy convictions against lay defendants. See id. at 839-845. 
68 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's concerns 
included whether every defendant must be advised of the right to self-representation, 
how waiver should be measured, whether their existed a right to standby counsel, 
whether a defendant may switch mid-trial, how soon in the proceeding must a defen-
dant decide to proceed pro se, whether a violation of the right to self-representation 
could ever constitute harmless error, and how a court is to treat a pro se defendant. 
See id. 
69 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
70 See id. 
71 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 390 (1993) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 
(1975». 
11
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him; 2) the accused must be able to assist in his defense; 3) the 
accused must know the consequences of entering a guilty plea; 
and 4) the accused must be able to waive the right of counsel 
knowingly and intelligently.72 In Godinez, a defendant charged 
with murder waived his right to counsel and proceeded pro 
se.73 After conviction at trial, he appealed, contending he was 
incompetent to waive his right to counsel because he was not 
competent to conduct his own defense.74 The Court, relying on 
Faretta, held that a defendant need not have legal training or 
an understanding of the rules of court or evidence to proceed 
pro se.76 Rather, the Court requires only that a defendant 
make a knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal waiver under 
Faretta.76 Therefore, the Court determined that for a defen-
dant to proceed pro se, the competency standard required to 
waive the right to counsel is the minimum required to stand 
t . 177 na. 
The Ninth Circuit further defined how Faretta should be 
applied by determining the competency level required to waive 
counsel. In United States v. Arlt,78 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the trial court could not assess a defendant's capacity to for-
mulate a petition when determining defendant's request to 
proceed pro se.79 Citing Godinez, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that a defendant's competency to proceed pro se must be de-
72 




See id. at 393. 
76 
See id. at 394. 
76 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 393-394. Applying this standard, the Court held that 
the defendant had competently waived his right to counsel and upheld his conviction. 
See id. 
77 
See id. at 399. The Court explained that there is no reason to believe that the 
decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning 
than the decision to waive other constitutional rights because the competence required 
to waive counsel is the competence to waive the right; not the competence to represent 
himself. The Court held this standard is the "rational understanding standard." [d. 
78 
41 F. 3d. 516 (9th Cir. 1994). 
79 
See id. at 518. The petition is described as "a rambling and illogical petition with 
without legal basis or merit." [d. 
12
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termined by his competency to stand trial, not by the defen-
dant's ability to represent himself.80 The Ninth Circuit, citing 
Godinez, held that the defendant was competent to waive 
counsel because he was competent to stand trial.81 
Since Faretta, the Ninth Circuit has consistently followed 
the guidelines set forth in Faretta to establish an intelligent 
and knowing waiver of the right to counsel. For example, in 
United States v. Van Krieken,82 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver under 
Faretta, finding that his choice was made "with his eyes 
open."s3 The Van Krieken court followed Faretta by requiring 
that a waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.84 The 
court determined that the defendant on numerous occasions 
sought to waive counsel and each time was apprised of dangers 
and consequences of proceeding pro se.85 Therefore, the court 
concluded that Van Krieken had made a valid waiver of his 
right to counsel. 86 
The Ninth Circuit has maintained similarly strict applica-
tions of Faretta to determine if waivers of counsel are effective. 
In United States v. Balough,87 the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Faretta by requiring a defendant to be apprised of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation before being allowed 
to proceed pro se.8S In Balough, the trial court never warned 
the defendant that he would be at a disadvantage by proceed-
80 . 




United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d. 227 (9th Cir. 1994). 
83 .. 
ld. at 229 (cItmg Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820). 
84 . 
See id. See also Faretta, 422 U.S. 806. 
85 . . 
See Van Kr&eken, 39 F.3d at 229. For example, the court appnsed the defendant 
of his right to an attorney and stated that one would be appointed if he could not af-
ford one. The court also explained each charge and the possible penalties. ld. 
86 S id ee . at 231. 
87 
820 F. 2d. 1485 (9th Cir. 1987) 
88 
See id. at 1488. 
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ing pro se. S9 Further, the trial court failed to warn how an at-
torney would be able to assist him in overcoming those disad-
vantages.90 Consequently, the court held that Balough had not 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.91 
The Ninth Circuit has also invalidated waivers under 
Faretta because lower courts failed to determine whether the 
waiver was knowing & intelligent. For example, in United 
States v. Mohawk,92 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant 
did not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel 
because the trial court failed to apprise the defendant of the 
nature of the charges and possible penalties.93 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the state failed to prove an intelligent and 
knowing waiver because the state failed to provide a record of 
the defendant engaging in a colloquy with the court in which 
he was "informed" of the charges against him and the possible 
penalties related to those charges,94 
The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the Faretta 
standard in determining issues related to the right to counsel. 95 
However, once a court determines that a defendant has compe-
tently waived counsel and allows the defendant to proceed pro 
S9 




See id. at 1490. See also United States v. Keen, 96 F. 3d. 425 (9th Cir. 1996). 
92 
20 F.3d. 1480 (9th Cir. 1994). 
93 
See id. at 1483. 
94 
See id. Relying on the Faretta holding that the state bears the burden of showing 
the validity of the defendant's waiver of trial counsel, the court concluded that the 
state had failed to meet it's burden by not being able to produce a record of the defen-
dant's colloquy with the lower court. See id. 
95 
See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balough, 
820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994); 
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96 
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Sav-
age v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
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se, issues such as standby counsel and access to legal materials 
affect the defendant's right to a fair tria1.96 
C. STANDBY COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
REPRESENTATION 
The Faretta Court recognized the value of standby counsel 
in protecting the interests of the pro se criminal defendant.97 
The Court stated that a trial court may appoint standby coun-
sel to assist a pro se defendant in the presentation of his de-
fense if the court finds that it is necessary.98 Additionally, 
Chief Justice Burger in his dissent stated, "some of the damage 
we can anticipate from a defendant's ill-advised insistence in 
conducting his own defense may be mitigated by appointing a 
qualified lawyer to sit in the case as the traditional 'friend of 
the court.',,99 
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,lOO Chief Justice Burger, in a 
concurring opinion, cited several reasons that a trial judge 
would be "well-advised" to appoint standby counsel when a de-
96 
See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An 
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 523-535 (1996). 
97 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852. 
98 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-835 n.46. The Court stated, "Of course, a State may -
even over the objection by the accused - appoint a "standby counsel" to aid the accused 
if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in 
the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary." [d. 
The Court assigned standby counsel the functions of assisting the defendant if re-
quested and, at the extreme, rescuing an accused in the event that termination of her 
self-defense is necessary. See id. Counsel can even be appointed over the defendant's 
objection. See id. All of these possibilities reside however, in the judicial basement of 
a footnote. This leaves the appointment of standby counsel as apparently nothing 
more than something the court is free to offer to criminal defendants should the judge 
see fit. See John H. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se Defendants: 
Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 697, 713 (1984). 
99 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 846 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger makes this 
suggestion in light of the impact Faretta may have on judicial efficiency and efficacy. 
He notes, "the newfound right to self-representation would create "added congestion 
in the courts and the quality of justice would suffer." [d. at 846. 
100 
400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
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fendant seeks to represent himself. 101 For example, standby 
counsel may assist the defendant in the event he is removed 
from the courtroom for disruptive behavior. 102 Further, 
standby counsel may intervene when the defendant realizes he 
lacks an appreciation of the consequences of his waiver and is 
unable to continue to represent his interest. l03 Ultimately, 
Chief Justice Burger stated that no limitations existed, consti-
tutional or otherwise, on a trial judge's absolute discretion to 
appoint standby counsel. 104 
In McKaskle v. Wiggins,105 the United States Supreme 
Court directly addressed the issue of standby counsel's effect 
on the right to self-representation. l06 In McKaskle, the pro se 
defendant claimed that standby counsel interfered with his 
right to self-representation. l07 The Court held that standby 
counsel's participation did not impair the defendant's Faretta 
rights. lOB Rather, the Court held that standby counsel may be 
appointed at the discretion of the inquiring tribunal so long as 
101 Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 468 (Burger, C.J., concurring). He also noted that if 
standby counsel were appointed, the defendant may consult with counsel, resolve his 
questions, and then continue to adequately represent himself. He concluded that the 
presence of standby counsel relaxes the duty on the part of the trial judge who main-
tains an extra burden during trials where a defendant is exercising his Faretta rights. 
See id. 




See id. He wrote, "[i]n every trial there is more at stake than just the interests 
of the accused; the integrity of the process warrants a trial judge's exercising his dis-
cretion to have counsel participate in the defense even when rejected ... The value of the 
precaution of having independent counsel, even if unwanted, is underscored by situa-
tions where the accused is removed from the courtroom." See Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 
465. 
105 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
106 See id. at 173. 
107 See id. The defendant claimed that his right to self-representation was compro-
mised by standby counsel repeatedly interjecting during defendant's defense and ar-
guing with the defendant over his defense. See id. at 174. 
lOB See id. at 175. The Court reasoned that standby counsel might provide the pro 
se litigant with needed assistance since the pro se status of a criminal defendant does 
not excuse the defendant from normal procedural rules. See McKaskle, 475 U.S. at 
184. 
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standby counsel allows the defendant actual control over the 
case and does not destroy the jury's perception that the defen-
dant is representing himself.l09 Finally, the Court determined 
that standby counsel may assist a pro se defendant in over-
coming procedural and evidentiary obstacles without interfer-
ing with McKaskle's Faretta rights. uO 
The Ninth Circuit has also discussed standby counsel's role 
in the pro se defense. In United States v. Robinson, III the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the defendant's use of standby counsel 
and the pro se defendant's access to materials in preparation 
for trial. U2 In Robinson, the defendant decided to proceed pro. 
se and in response, the district court appointed standby coun-
sel prior to trial. U3 Robinson wa's convicted at trial and on ap-
peal, argued that his right to self-representation had been 
compromised because standby counsel had failed to assist in 
providing an adequate defense. U4 The Ninth Circuit held that 
conflicts with standby counsel do not abrogate the defendant's 
right to self-representation because the Sixth Amendment does 
not compel counsel to blindly follow defendant's instruction. us 
The court concluded that Robinson had made a valid waiver of 
109 
See McKaskle, 475 U.S. at 178. The Court noted that standby counsel's partici-
pation over the defendant's objection, allowing counsel to make or substantially inter-
fere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, 
or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, would erode defen-
dant's Faretta right. See id. 
110 
See id. at 183. Obstacles include introducing evidence or objecting to testimony, 
which the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to complete. Counsel may also assist 
to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and proce-
dure. See id. 
111 
913 F. 2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990). 
U2S id ee . 
113 
See id. at 715. 
U4 S'd Rob h ee, . at 716. inson ad numerous tactical disagreements with appointed 
standby counsel and felt the court's refusal to take this into consideration violated his 
right to self-representation. See id. 
115 
See Robinson, 913 F.2d at 715-716. 
17
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the right to counsel and that his dissatisfaction with appointed 
standby counsel could not constitute reversible error.U6 
Additionally, Robinson argued that he was forced to accept 
standby counsel as the only alternative to having limited ac-
cess to legal materials.117 Specifically, the court noted that re-
quiring a defendant to choose between appointed counsel and 
access to legal materials does not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment. 118 The court determined that limited access to legal ma-
terials for pro se defendants was constitutional because the 
limitation conforms to perceived needs of prison 
management. 119 In this context, the court held that a defen-
dant may be made to choose between appointed counsel and 
access to legal materials because the Sixth Amendment is sat-
isfied by the offer of professional representation alone. 120 So 
long as an alternative to standby counsel does not offend the 
Constitution, it will be upheld. 121 
The Ninth Circuit further defined the role of standby coun-
sel by increasing the level of standby counsel's participation. 
In United States v. Kimmel,122 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court may allow a hybrid form of representation.123 
Hybrid representation allows the accused to assume some of 




See id. at 717. Robinson's limited access to legal materials consisted of the dis-
trict court's decision to allow Robinson only one box of legal materials. Prior to the 
order, Robinson had accumulated six boxes oflegal materials. See id. 
118 
See id. at 717-718. 
119 See Robinson, 913 F.2d at 718. The court alluded to security considerations and 
the limitations of the penal system as reasons for limiting defendant's access to legal 
materials. Furthermore, the court noted the defendant was offered opportunities to 
transfer to another jail and conduct more expansive research there; something defen-
dant turned down because he felt the offered facility was "too crowded." [d. 
120 




672 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981). 
123 S id ee . 
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waiver.124 In Kimmel, a defendant charged with a drug-related 
offense elected to proceed pro se and the court appointed 
standby counsel to assist in his defense. 125 Although standby 
counsel actively argued before the jury and acted as the domi-
nant spokesperson for the defense, the court noted that counsel 
did not assume all the duties of retained or appointed 
counsel. 126 In this context, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 
"hybrid' form of standby counsel is constitutional, so long as 
the defendant's waiver of counsel comports with the Faretta 
. t 127 reqwremen s. 
However, the Ninth Circuit has also limited a defendant's 
right to proceed pro se. In Savage v. Estelle,128 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a defendant with a severe speech impediment 
could not exercise the right of self-representation because he 
was unable to communicate to the jury.129 In Savage, a defen-
dant charged with assault elected to proceed pro se.130 After a 
Faretta hearing, the district court granted the defendant's re-
quest to proceed pro se.131 However, standby counsel was ap-
pointed to assist the defendant in presenting his case to the 
jury because of the defendant's severe speech impediment.132 
The Ninth Circuit relied on McKaskle133 where they earlier de-
nied the defendant the opportunity to proceed pro se because 
he was unable to abide by courtroom procedure. 134 Citing 
McKaskle, the Ninth Circuit held that allowing standby coun-
id. 
124 • 








908 F. 2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990). 
129 
See id. at 509. 
130 
See id. The defendant decided to proceed pro se during pre· trial motions. See 
131 S id ee . 
132 
See Sauage, 908 F.2d at 509. 
133 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
134 
See id. at 173. 
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sel to handle the core functions of the defense did not violate 
defendant's right to self-representation when the defendant is 
unable to competently present his case to the jury.136 
Faretta and its progeny established a procedural minimum 
standard, implied under the Sixth Amendment, which must be 
met before a criminal defendant will be allowed to represent 
himself. 136 This standard requires a trial court to engage in a 
colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the defendant is 
literate, competent, understanding, that he or she knowingly 
and voluntarily intends to waive his or her Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, and that the defendant is aware of the dan-
gers and disadvantages of self-representation. 137 Once these 
facts are established, the court may grant the waiver and allow 
the defendant to proceed pro se.138 The defendant is expected, 
however, to present a defense conforming to the court and evi-
dentiary rules. 139 Furthermore, a defendant is barred from 
raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for 
appeal when he conducts a pro se defense or is assisted by 
standby counsel in that capacity. 140 Thus, the need for the in-
formed and effective exercise of the right to self-representation 
is crucial. In this regard, standby counsel has become an im-
portant aspect of the right to self-representation.141 
136 
See Savage, 908 F.2d at 515. 
136 
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. 
U7 . 
See Frederic Paul Gallun, The Sixth Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments 
on the Right to Waive Counsel Under Faretta, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CN. 






Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-835 n. 46. The Court explained, "The right to self-
representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a 
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus, 
whatever mayor may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to repre-
sent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted 
to a denial of 'effective assistance of counsel'" [d. 
141 
See Decker, supra note 96, at 523-524. 
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D. CURRENT CASE LAW: MARTINEZ V. COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA 
149 
Despite Faretta's influence in the Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence of the past twenty years, a recent case reveals the 
United States Supreme Court's divergence from key aspects of 
Faretta's analysis. In Martinez v. California Court of Appeal, 142 
the Court addressed the right to self-representation in appel-
late proceedings.143 Defendant, a paralegal, was charged with 
grand theft and embezzlement of client funds. 144 Martinez 
elected to proceed pro se.145 He was subsequently convicted 
and filed a timely notice of appeal along with a motion for self-
representation to the California Court of Appeal. 146 The court 
denied his motion, holding that denial of self-representation at 
the appellate level does not violate due process or equal protec-
t · t 147 Ion guaran ees. 
The Supreme Court affirmed California's decision, stating 
three reasons why Faretta was inapplicable.148 First, the Court 
reasoned that Faretta relied on outmoded information. 149 Spe-
cifically, the Martinez Court stated that the historical right to 
self-representation "pertained to times when lawyers were 
scarce, often mistrusted, and not readily available to the aver-
age person accused of crime. "150 Second, the Court found 
Faretta's reliance on the Sixth Amendment's structure and his-
tory inapplicable because the Amendment did not contemplate 
the right to counsel in appellate proceedings. 161 Third, the 
Court reasoned that the right to waive counsel is not 
142 




See id. at 686. 
146 




See Martinez, 120 S.Ct. at 687. 
148 




[d. at 688. 
161 
See id. at 690. 
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absolute. 152 Rather, the Court noted that the risk of disloyalty 
by a court-appointed attorney, or the suspicion of such disloy-
alty, that underlies the right of self-representation at trial is 
insufficient to warrant its necessity at the appellate level. 153 
Martinez reflects a shift in the Court's application of 
Faretta. The Court recognized the failings of self-
representation, stating, "experience has taught us that 'a pro 
se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when com-
pared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense 
attorney.,"154 Furthermore, the Court remarked in a footnote 
that "even at the trial level, the government's interest in en-
suring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times out-
weighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer."155 
Nevertheless, Faretta is still valid law because the Court's de-
CISIon in Martinez only applies to appellate self-
representation. 156 Moreover, Martinez tacitly recognized the 
right to self-representation at the trial level. 157 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Farhad,158 the Ninth Circuit confirmed 
the right to self-representation by following Faretta's holding 
that a knowing, intelligent and unequivocal waiver represents 
a valid waiver of the right to counsel. 159 In determining 
whether Farhad's waiver was valid, the court addressed the 
"knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal" requirements with the 
understanding that the burden of proving a waiver's legality 
152 
Martinez, 120 S.Ct. at 691. 
153 . 
See Id. at 690-691. 
154 
See id. at 691 (citing Decker, supra note 96, at 598). 
155 
Martinez, 120 S.Ct. at 691. 
156 




190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 
159 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100. 
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rests with the state, "indulging every reasonable presumption 
. tth . "160 agams e waIver. 
A. KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER 
Citing Faretta and Ninth Circuit precedent,161 the court re-
stated the rule that a waiver of counsel is "knowing and intel-
ligent" only if the defendant is aware of the nature of the 
charges against him, the possible penalties, and the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation.162 Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the record must establish that 
"[the defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with his eyes open. "163 The Ninth Circuit also noted that the 
preferred procedure is for each component of the rule to be dis-
cussed separately in open court. 164 
Analyzing the three "knowing and intelligent" factors, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the district court "conscien-
tiously conducted the appropriate inquiry. "165 The district 
court informed Farhad of the charges against him and of the 
possible penalties each charge carried. 166 The district court 
160 • 
See ,d. at 1099-1100. 
161 . .. 
See Umted States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Crr. 1994); Umted States v. Balough, 
820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994); 
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96 
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Sav-
age v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
162 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. 
163 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1009 (citing United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485 (9th 
Cir.1987). 
164 See id. The majority acknowl~dged that as soon as Farhad requested to proceed 
pro se, the trial judge immediately held a hearing in open court to determine the va-
lidity of Farhad's waiver. See w. 
165 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. 
166 
See id. at 1098. The district court judge informed Farhad that he was charged 
with 19 counts, informed him of the maximum penalty on each count, and pointed out 
the potential consequences for him in state prison if he incurred a new federal convic-
tion. See w. 
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also discussed the disadvantages of self-representation. 167 Fur-
ther, Farhad repeated his desire to provide his own defense, 
despite the district court's numerous warnings that he was 
"making it hard on himself. "168 Based on these facts, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Farhad had made a knowing and intel-
1· t . 169 Igen waIver. 
B. UNEQUIVOCAL WAIVER 
In addition to the knowing and intelligent requirement, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that a valid waiver must be 
unequivocal. 170 In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit analogized 
the facts in Farhad to those in Van Krieken. l7l In Van Krieken, 
the defendant made numerous requests to waive counsel de-
spite warnings of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 
pro se.172 The Ninth Circuit held that these numerous requests 
constituted an unequivocal decision to proceed pro se. 173 Simi-
larly in Farhad, the Ninth Circuit noted that Farhad's re-
peated requests to proceed pro se indicated his unequivocal 
waiver of his right to counsel and not "mere whim or 
• "174 capnce. 
167 
See id. The majority found that the district court adequately warned Farhad by 
informing him of the "core functions" of an attorney. The Ninth Circuit also noted that 
the district court warned Farhad that he would be expected to perform those functions 
at trial. The majority also determined that the district court warned Farhad that he 
would be expected to ask questions, make arguments, and observe the rules of evi-
dence and courtroom procedure. See id. 
168 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098-1099. After the initial hearing, Farhad reaffirmed 
his choice to proceed pro se on at least two separate occasions. First, when he was 
denied standby counsel and second, when the court refused his request for an investi-
gator. On both occasions, the court warned Farhad of the disadvantages of proceeding 
pro se but Farhad maintained his position. See id. 
169 
See id. at 1100. 
170 
See id. (citing Van Krieken, 39 F.3d at 229 (9th Cir. 1994». 
171 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100. 
172 
See Van Krieken, 39 F.3d at 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1994). 
173 
See id. at 230. 
174 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100. 
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C. THE MERITS OF FARE1TA 
The Ninth Circuit denied Farhad's request to reconsider the 
validity of the right to self-representation in criminal trials as 
recognized in Faretta. 175 Relying on state and federal court 
decisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Farhad's request 
for an advisory opinion on Faretta would be an improper exer-
cise of the court's discretion. 176 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that courts have expanded the 
Faretta right. 177 Specifically, the court discussed Godinez v. 
Moran which extended the Faretta right to all criminal defen-
dants, including those who are mentally impaired.17s The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the "overwhelming weight" of 
precedent .supported its refusal to review the Faretta 
decision.179 Concluding that the Faretta right to self-
representation is firmly established, the Ninth Circuit held 
that Farhad had knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally 
waived his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.1so 
175 
See id. at 1100-1101. On appeal, Farhad requested the Ninth Circuit to recon-
sider the validity of Faretta. See id. 
176 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had pub-
lished "dozens of opinions" applying Faretta, specifically citing cases discussed herein. 
See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balough, 820 
F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994); 
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96 
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Sav-
age v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
177 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1100. 
17S See id. (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993». The Ninth Circuit held 
that a defendant may waive his right to counsel so long as they are "competent to 
stand trial." [d. 
179 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101. 
ISO 
See id. at 1100. 
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D. JunGE REINHARDT'S CONCURRING OPINION 
Judge Reinhardt agreed with the majority that Farhad had 
constitutionally waived his right to counsel. 181 However, Judge 
Reinhardt concluded that even if Farhad's waiver comported 
with the United States Constitution, his trial did not.182 Judge 
Reinhardt noted that though Faretta has been continually reaf-
firmed,l83 the Court has never addressed the Faretta dissent-
ers' concerns "that a conviction in a proceeding so fundamen-
tally flawed that, were it not for Faretta, would undoubtedly 
offend minimum constitutional standards of fairness.,,184 
1. The Right to a Fair Trial and the Sixth Amendment 
The Constitution guarantees every defendant the funda-
mental, absolute right to a fair trial. Judge Reinhardt argued 
that, unlike the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel and 
the implied right to self-representation are not absolute 
rights. 180 Rather, the right to counsel is like all other proce-
dural guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, all of which must 
yield to the substantive right. 186 
Quoting the Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas/87 Judge 
Reinhardt noted, "the right to a fair trial is the most funda-
mental of all freedoms," essential to the preservation and en-
joyment of all other rights. 188 Judge Reinhardt further stated 
that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment are best viewed as 
"institutional safeguards for attaining the overarching objec-
181 
See id. at 1101. 
179 
See id. at 1101-1102. Judge Reinhardt noted that Farhad's fundamentally 
flawed performance at trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. Id. 
183 S 7 d . ee supra notes 51-15 an accompanymg text. 
184 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting». 
18DS 'd ee, . 
186 See id. Judge Reinhardt argued Sixth Amendment guarantees are a "means to 
achieve the substantive objective of the fair trial." Id. 
187 
381 U.S. 532 (1965). , 
W8 •• 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105 (cltmg Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965». 
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tive of a fair trial."189 Judge Reinhardt argued that permitting 
self-representation regardless of the consequences threatens to 
"divert" criminal trials from their "clearly defined purpose" of 
providing a "fair and reliable determination. "190 
Judge Reinhardt also criticized the court's decision to carry 
the Faretta holding to its illogical conclusion by holding that 
any defendant, even one who is severely mentally impaired, 
has the right to proceed pro se so long as he is minimally com-
petent.191 He also lamented the court's expansion of those eli-
gible to be pro se defendants to include juveniles and illiter-
ates. 192 This expansion of the Faretta right, Judge Reinhardt 
concluded, is squarely opposed to the guarantee of a fair 
t . 1193 na. 
2. Waiving the Right to a Fair Trial 
Judge Reinhardt addressed the issue of whether a defen-
dant may waive his right to a fair trial. 194 He concluded that 
he may not, reasoning that the government has a compelling 
interest, related to its own legitimacy, in ensuring both fair 
procedures and reliable outcomes in criminal trials, both of 
which are thwarted when an incapable or incompetent defen-
dant proceeds pro se.195 Conversely, Judge Reinhardt pointed 
to the justification for allowing a defendant to waive his right 
to counsel under Faretta because "it is he who suffers the con-
sequences if his defense fails."196 However, Judge Reinhardt 
concluded that waving the right to a fair trial creates a larger 
189 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1106 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965». 
190 • 
• d. 
191 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1106 (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 389). 
192 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1107 (citing Peters v. Gunn, 33 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 
1994»; See also Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: Empirical 
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989). 
193 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105-1106. 
194 




Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1107 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975». 
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problem because the right to a fair trial implicates not only the 
interests of the individual defendant, but the "institutional 
interests" of the judicial system.197 He stated that "not only the 
defendant 'suffers the consequences' when a fair trial is denied, 
but the justice system itself. "198 
Judge Reinhardt then discussed the issue of whether the 
Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial may be implicitly waived 
as it was in Farhad. 199 Judge Reinhardt concluded that it may 
not be. Citing Brewer v. Williams,200 he noted that waivers of 
constitutional rights are disfavored, and that courts indulge 
every reasonable presumption against them.201 Thus, he con-
cluded, when waiving a right as important as the right to a fair 
trial, "waiver by implication would appear highly inappropri-
t ~02 a e. 
3. Procedural Concerns 
Judge Reinhardt pointed out that a strict Faretta inquiry 
creates a judiciary "with eyes wide shut. ~03 He concluded that 
after the pre-trial stages in which the Faretta inquiry occurs, 
the constitutionality of the trial is rendered irrelevant.204 Fur-
thermore, he noted that an inquiry into the constitutionality of 
a hearing is determined by reviewing the entire proceeding, 
including the trial itself to determine whether it comports with 
constitutional standards of fairness. 205 Judge Reinhardt con-
cluded that Farhad is a prime example of the judiciary "avert-
197 See id. at 1107. 
198 [d. 
199 See id. at 1108. 
200 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
201 See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1108 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977». 
202 
[d. at 1108. 




See id. at 1105. See also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (holding 
that judicial review of due process requires an exercise of judgment upon an entire 
course of a proceeding to determine whether a violation has occurred). 
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ing its gaze" from Farhad's pitiful attempt to, in his own 
words, "make a more glorious kind of a defense. ,,206 
Lastly, Judge Reinhardt discussed the need for balancing 
the right to self-representation and the right to a fair trial. 207 
He pointed out that both require consideration as constitu-
tional rights in the criminal justice system.208 He continued, 
"as with most other individual rights, there are competing and 
countervailing interests, both personal and social. ,,209 Judge 
Reinhardt concluded by requesting the courts to "develop rules 
for determining when the exercise of the right to self-
representation would be consistent with the mandate of the 
Fifth Amendment [right to a fair trial], and when it would 
not.,,210 In conclusion, he noted that the adoption of a rule to 
delineate the coexistence of seemingly competing rights must 
be determined by the Supreme Court, not by lower courts.2l1 
V. CRITIQUE 
Relying on the Supreme Court holding in Faretta and sub-
sequent case history, the Ninth Circuit's majority in Farhad 
concluded that the defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and 
unequivocally waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 212 
However, the Ninth Circuit's decision failed to address key 
procedural and substantive concerns related to the right of 
self-representation.213 Those concerns, raised by Justice 
Blackmun in Faretta and again by Justice Reinhardt in 
Farhad, relate to the potential denial of a fair trial in granting 
206 
Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. 
207 . 
See id. at 1108. 
208 
See id. 
209 ld. Judge Reinhardt also wrote that the implied right to self-representation 
"allows Farhad and others with similar limitations or incapacitates to turn criminal 
trials into travesties." ld. 
210 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1108. 
211 
See id. at 1108-1109. 
212 See United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). 
213 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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the defendant's right to proceed pro se.214 In Farhad, the 
Ninth Circuit conducted the Faretta analysis with no attempt 
to address the fair trial concerns of the defendant or Justice 
Reinhardt's concurring opinion.215 The Ninth Circuit merely 
addressed the validity of the waiver of the right to counsel in a 
216 vacuum. 
The Ninth Circuit's strict reading of Faretta inadequately 
addressed the conflict between a defendant's right to autonomy 
and society's interest in maintaining fairness in criminal 
trials.217 The importance of the right to a fair trial requires 
that the court adopt procedures designed to minimize the po-
tentially destructive effects of a defendant's waiver of counsel 
for the individual defendant and the judicial system as a 
whole.218 In Farhad, the defendant's desire for autonomy in a 
criminal trial outweighed the court's concern for a fair trial.219 
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's analysis also failed to bal-
ance these interests appropriately.220 
Though courts are bound by Farettaas Supreme Court 
precedent, later cases from the Supreme Court221 and the 
Ninth Circuie22 have discussed procedures and guidelines to 
214 See id. See also Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. Justice Reinhardt's argues the Fifth 
Amendment right to a fair trial supersedes the procedural rights of the Sixth Amend-
ment. Specifically, he argues that the Fifth Amendment should not be compromised by 
the right to self-representation when a pro se defendant (i.e., Farhad) conducts a de-
fense that makes a mockery of the judicial system. See id. 
215 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101. 
216 See id. at 1098-1100. 
217 See id. at 1108. Agreeing with Judge Reinhardt's concurrence. 
218 See John H. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se Defendants: Main-
taining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 697, 713 (1984). Pearson ar-
gues for procedural mechanisms such as mandatory standby counsel to counteract the 
detrimental effects of self-representation on a defendant's right to a fair trial. See id. 
219 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101. 
220 See id. at 1108. 
221 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); McKaskle v, Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 
(1984). 
222 See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balough, 
820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1994); 
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assist the criminal defendant in presenting a pro se defense. 
This case law indicates that though Farhad is bound by 
Faretta as precedent, there is enough flexibility to consider 
means of protecting both rights essential to a criminal trial: 
the defendant's need for a fair trial and the importance of the 
right to self-representation. 223 
The Ninth Circuit in Farhad could have better resolved this 
conflict by addressing two of Farhad's requests to the district 
court: first, his request for "standbylhybrid" counsel, and sec-
ond, his request for greater access to legal materials during the 
district court proceedings.224 Granting these two requests 
would have enhanced Farhad's chances of receiving a fair trial 
under the Fifth Amendment. At the same time, Faretta would 
have been satisfied because Farhad could have maintained his 
autonomy by controlling his own defense. 
A. RECOGNIZING STANDBY COUNSEL'S ROLE 
Following Faretta, the United States Supreme Court in 
McKaskle v. Wiggini25 recognized the constitutionality of 
standby counsel in connection with the right to self-
representation.226 The Court developed a two-part test to de-
termine the constitutionality of standby counsel. 227 First, the 
pro se defendant must preserve actual control over the case he 
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Keen, 96 
F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1996); United State v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990); Sav-
age v. Estelle, 908 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
223 • • • 
For example, standby counsel has been a pnnclpal means of protectmg the pro 
se defendant from the pitfalls of proceeding without counsel. See McKaskle v. Wig-
gins, 465 U.S. 168, 175 (1984). 
224 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1099. 
225 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
226 
See id. at 169. However, standby counsel is not a right; it is a privilege which is 
left to the discretion of the trial judge. See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment 
Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-
Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 525 (1996). 
227 
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. 
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chooses to present to the jury.228 Second, standby counsel's ac-
tions should preserve the jury's perception that defendant is 
conducting his own defense.229 Furthermore, the pro se defen-
dant should be allowed to address the court freely on his own 
behalf. 230 If disagreements between standby counsel and the 
pro se defendant arise, they are resolved in the defendant's 
favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left 
to the discretion of counsel. 231 The McKaskle Court concluded 
that unsolicited participation of standby counsel may provide a 
defendant with needed assistance because pro se status does 
not excuse a defendant from abiding by normal procedural 
rul 232 es. 
Ultimately, the pro se defendant must be allowed to control 
the organization and content of his own defense, to make mo-
tions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to ques-
tion witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appro-
priate points in the tria1.233 These rights, the Court explained, 
228 [d. 
229 
[d. at 178. 
230 
See id. at 179. 
231 
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179. 
232 
See id. at 183-184. A commentator notes that standby counsel may enter objec-
tions or make other moves to further the defense, even against the defendant's will. 
Counsel may also on her own take steps to aid the defendant in surmounting proce-
dural hurdles, thereby freeing the judge from this task. The defendant, "does not have 
a constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on constitu-
tional procedure," nor is the judge constitutionally required "to take over chores for a 
pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of 
course. "" In setting limits to the pro se right, the court has identified those areas 
where the efforts can be made to protect the essential fairness and adequacy of trials 
as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments without violating the Faretta 
right to self-defense. By expanding the limits within which standby counsel may con-
stitutionally function, McKaskle increases the efficacy of such counsel in protecting a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Pearson, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se 
Defendants, 72 CAL. L. REV. at 704. 
233 
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173-187. See also Frederic Paul Gallun, The Sixth 
Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments on the Right to Waive Counsel Under 
Faretta, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIY. CONFINEMENT 559 (1997). 
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represent the crux of the defendant's right to self-
t t · 234 represen a Ion. 
Courts have also expanded the role of standby counsel to 
that of "hybrid counsel," in which both defendant and attorney 
present the defense.236 Though Faretta does not guarantee a 
criminal defendant the constitutional right to hybrid represen-
tation, the Ninth Circuit has held otherwise.236 In the Ninth 
Circuit, trial courts may at their discretion, grant an accused's 
request to assume some of the attorney's functions. 237 In 
United States v. Kimmel,238 the Ninth Circuit held that "the 
district court has the authority to allow a hybrid form of repre-
sentation in which the accused assumes some of the lawyer's 
functions. ~39 A hybrid form of standby counsel is a logical 
remedy for the risks a pro se defense poses to a fair trial. 240 
Standby counsel can significantly lessen the negative effects of 
a pro se defense while maintaining the defendant's right to 
self-representation. 
234 
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173-187. The Court highlighted the following func-
tions Wiggins performed during the course of the trial: 1) filing numerous pro se mo-
tions, 2) cross-examining the prosecutions witnesses, 3) registering objections, 4) se-
lecting and examining witnesses, 5) deciding which questions would not be asked by 
the defense, 6) determining when the defense would rest, 7) making objections to sug-
gested jury charges as well as filing his own jury charges, and 8) giving a closing ar-
gument to the jury. The Court held that the defendant's Faretta rights were not vio-
lated because he had ample opportunity to control his own pre-trial and trial presenta-
tions and also, in light of the entire record, any unsolicited participation by standby 
cOUDsel was reasonable. Id. at 174-175. 
236 
See United States v. Kimmel, 672 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir, 1982): 
236 See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183. Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit 
"hybrid" representation. See id. 
. 237 
See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New 
Paths - A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9 (1986) (explaining that courts often reject 
hybrid representation on the basis of "efficiency considerations as well as solicitude for 
the attomey"). While. trial courts in all jurisdictions adhere to some fundamental 
rules concerning hybrid representation, courts in most jurisdictions routinely deny 
requests for any form of mixed representation.ld. 
238 
672 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982). 
239 
Id. at 721. 
240 
See Pearson, supra note 218, at 713. 
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However, hybrid counsel should not be limited to cases de-
pendent on the court's exercise of discretion. Rather, hybrid 
counsel should be mandatory in all cases where a criminal de-
fendant elects to proceed pro se because most defendants do 
not fully appreciate the risks involved in self-representation, 
regardless of the Faretta inquiry.241 Furthermore, the benefits 
of hybrid counsel far outweigh its disadvantages. For example, 
hybrid counsel protects the lay defendant from procedural and 
evidentiary pitfalls, many of which Farhad suffered.242 The 
only arguable disadvantage may be that the defendant's 
autonomy is compromised. However, under McKaskle, the de-
fendant controls the defense, ensuring his autonomy is pro-
tected on a certain level. 243 The defendant may utilize hybrid 
counsel to the extent necessary to adequately represent his 
case. In Farhad, the defendant requested this type of shared 
representation and the district court denied his request, laying 
the foundations for Farhad's failure at trial. 244 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE F ARHAO'S NEED 
FOR HYBRID COUNSEL 
The district court in Farhad appointed standby counsel.245 
However, Farhad requested a "hybrid form" of representation 
which allowed him to make opening and closing statements 
and exercise challenges during jury selection.246 The district 
court flatly rejected Farhad's request.247 If the district court 
had granted his request, Farhad would not have had the op-
241 
See id. at 713-715. 
242 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102-1104. 
243 
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. 
244 





247 See id. The court responded: "It cannot be done that way. You do it all or [the 
public defender] does it all." [d. 
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portunity to make a mockery of the trial system with his ''more 
glorious kind of defensen248 
"Hybrid representation" in Farhad would have satisfied 
constitutional standards set forth in McKaskle. Under 
McKaskle, the pro se defendant must retain actual control over 
the defense249 and standby counsel's actions cannot alter the 
jury's perception that the defendant is conducting his own de-
fense.25o If these requirements are met, hybrid counsel would 
be appropriate under Faretta. 
Granting Farhad's request for hybrid counsel would not 
have affected his actual control over the case. Specifically, 
while Farhad wanted hybrid counsel to represent him 
throughout the trial, he wanted to make his own opening and 
closing statements himselC51 Because the opening statement 
serves as an overview for the defense by outlining the defense's 
arguments and detailing what types of evidence will be admit-
ted, Farhad could have "set the course" of his defense with his 
opening statement. Similarly, Farhad could have used the 
closing argument as an opportunity to distill the defense's ar-
guments and provide a summary of what the jury had seen. 
The jury's perception of whether Farhad had conducted the 
defense would not have been affected by appointing hybrid 
standby counsel. Farhad stated he would conduct jury selec-
tion and present both opening and closing statements.252 Al-
lowing Farhad to select the jury would give potential jurors the 
impression that he had control over his defense. Furthermore, 
by presenting the opening and closing statements, Farhad 
would appear to be in control of his own case. He would, in 
effect, be the first person and last person the jury would en-
248 
See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102. Farhad, in response to the court's inquiry why he 
wanted to proceed pro se, responded that he wanted to present a "more glorious kind 
of defense." [d. 
249 
See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. 
250 S id ee . 
251 
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counter from the defendant's table. Thus, if Farhad shared 
duties with hybrid standby counsel, it appears he would have 
maintained actual control over the defense and provided the 
jury with the impression that he had control over his defense. 
C. THE 9TH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED FARHAD ACCESS 
TO INVESTIGATIVE AND RESEARCH MATERIALS 
Hybrid counsel for a pro se defendant would also alleviate 
other problems characteristic of a pro se defense, such as the 
pro se defendant's lack of access to legal materials. For exam-
ple, in Farhad, a defendant who refuses the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel also lacks the unlimited access to a law library 
or other legal materials that counsel would bring to the de-
fense. 253 Standby counsel, however, could serve as a conduit 
through which the pro se defendant may gain access to other-
wise unobtainable materials.254 
Traditionally, courts have extended judicial assistance only 
to pro se litigants who are prisoners.255 Prisoners, these courts 
claim, have problems that justify the burden placed on the ad-
versary system by treating them in a lenient manner.256 These 
problems include limited legal access to legal materials and 
sources of proof.257 As prisoners, criminal defendants are lim-
ited by physical and monetary restrictions to building their 
defenses.258 Farhad is a prime example of these limitations. 
253 S id ee . 
254 
See Pear8on, supra note 218, at 718. 
255 See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F. 2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Moore v. Florida, 703 





258 S id ee . 
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Farhad, as a prisoner, did not have access to witnesses or 
legal research.259 He was offered only limited use of library 
materials.260 Hybrid counsel would have alleviated this prob-
lem because the lawyer does not have these restrictions. Thus, 
in an effort to alleviate the burdens associated with research 
and investigation in preparation for his defense, Farhad's 
rights as a defendant would have been better protected had 
"hybrid counsel" been assigned to him. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Farhad is an unnecessarily 
narrow reading of a defendant's right to proceed pro se under 
Faretta. Such a strict following of Faretta compromises not 
only the defendant's right to a fair trial, but society's interest 
in a just criminal trial system. To alleviate this tension, man-
datory hybrid counsel offers a means for meeting the interests 
of all parties to the judicial process. 
Courts must provide hybrid counsel in all criminal cases, 
even over a defendant's objection. If a defendant were given 
the option of waiving standby counsel, it would circumvent the 
goal of protecting the unknowing pro se defendant rights. Cost 
to the system may become an issue, but this concern is miti-
gated by the efficient administration of justice. Courts dealing 
with defendants assisted by hybrid counsel would avoid the 
hassles and delays normally associated with the pro se de-
fense. 
All participants in the criminal trial would benefit from a 
defendant with mandatory hybrid counsel. Defendants, while 
controlling their cases, would have access to the information 
and . materials necessary for an effective defense.261 Courts 
would no longer be compelled to "care for" pro se defendants, 
259 Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1098-1099. Farhad's standby counsel at trial did not access 
witnesses or conduct legal research for Farhad. It appears his role was limited to 
solely assisting Farhad at trial. See id. 
260 
See id. at 1100. 
261 
See Pearson, supra note 218, at 719. 
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and trials would not be hampered by a defendant's lack of 
technical expertise.262 Prosecutors could act as fully effective 
adversaries, confident that the advised defendant is a· worthy 
opponent.263 Hybrid counsel ensures that the defendant com-
plies with courtroom procedures and that courts follow due 
process requirements.264 Additionally, hybrid counsel would 
assist the court in appropriately and efficiently hearing the 
case. Finally and most importantly, society would benefit from 
a criminal justice system that, in accordance with the Fifth 
Amendment, guarantees a fair trial to every defendant. 
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